

1 ELIZABETH B. WYDRA (BAR No. 218200)
2 BRIANNE J. GOROD
3 BRIAN R. FRAZELLE
4 CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER
5 1200 18th Street NW, Suite 501
6 Washington, D.C. 20036
7 (202) 296-6889
8 elizabeth@theusconstitution.org

9 *Counsel for Amicus Curiae*

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11
12 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
13 **FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
14 **OAKLAND DIVISION**

15 IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER;
16 EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT;
17 COALITION FOR HUMANE IMMIGRANT
18 RIGHTS; CATHOLIC LEGAL
19 IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC.;
20 INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE;
21 ONEAMERICA; ASIAN COUNSELING AND
22 REFERRAL SERVICE; ILLINOIS
23 COALITION FOR IMMIGRANT AND
24 REFUGEE RIGHTS,

25 Plaintiffs,

26 v.

27 CHAD F. WOLF, *under the title of Acting*
28 *Secretary of Homeland Security*; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI,
under the title of Senior Official Performing the
Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security; U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:20-cv-05883-JSW

**BRIEF OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS**

Date: October 9, 2020

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Place: Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor

Judge: Honorable Jeffrey S. White

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1 **INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE***¹

2 Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC) is a think tank, public interest law firm, and
3 action center dedicated to fulfilling the progressive promise of our Constitution’s text and
4 history. CAC works in our courts, through our government, and with legal scholars to improve
5 understanding of the Constitution and to preserve the rights and freedoms it guarantees. CAC
6 has a strong interest in preserving the checks and balances set out in our nation’s charter, as well
7 as the proper interpretation of laws that help maintain that balance.
8

9 **INTRODUCTION**

10 The Secretary of Homeland Security is empowered to make a range of decisions that
11 have enormous consequences for those affected. To help ensure that the Secretary wields those
12 powers responsibly, the Constitution requires that he or she be appointed by the President with
13 the advice and consent of the Senate. “By limiting the appointment power in this fashion,” the
14 Constitution seeks to make the officers who exercise the authority of the federal government
15 “accountable to political force and the will of the people.” *Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for*
16 *Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC*, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1657 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). But
17 despite that, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has operated without a Senate-
18 confirmed Secretary for more than a year. Instead, lower-level officials, who were never vetted
19 by the Senate for the Secretary’s role, have run the Department and steered its policies.
20
21

22 In August 2020, the purported Acting Secretary of DHS, Chad Wolf, approved a final
23 rule that “drastically increases the cost of applying for immigration benefits, including
24 naturalization and asylum.” Complaint ¶ 1 (citing 85 Fed. Reg. 46,788 (Aug. 3, 2020)). Among
25
26

27 ¹ No person or entity other than *amici* and their counsel assisted in or made a monetary
28 contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel for all parties have consented
to the filing of this brief.

1 other things, the new rule “charges a non-waivable fee for asylum applications for the first time
2 in U.S. history” and “increases the cost of applying to naturalize, in some cases from \$0 to
3 \$1,170 for the lowest income applicants.” *Id.*

4
5 Chad Wolf, however, has no legal authority to hold the position of Acting Secretary, and
6 he therefore lacked the power to alter DHS policy through this new rule. Federal laws, including
7 the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), place careful limits on service by acting
8 officials in order to preserve the Senate’s constitutional power over appointments. Under those
9 laws, Wolf was not a valid Acting Secretary when he approved the fee rule, and his approval is
10 therefore void. For these reasons, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.
11

12 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

13 The FVRA limits who may serve as an acting officer during a vacancy, 5 U.S.C. § 3345,
14 as well as the length of that service, *id.* § 3346. It is the “exclusive” means for temporarily
15 filling vacant offices, unless another statute “expressly” provides otherwise. *Id.* § 3347(a).
16

17 Under the FVRA and the organic statute governing DHS, Chad Wolf has never been
18 authorized to serve as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. His claim to hold that position
19 rests entirely on an order issued by his predecessor, Kevin McAleenan. But because McAleenan
20 himself was never a valid Acting Secretary, he had no power to install Wolf as his successor.
21 When the last Senate-confirmed Secretary resigned in April 2019, McAleenan was not eligible to
22 become Acting Secretary under the Department’s line of succession. Although DHS claims that
23 the former Secretary changed this line of succession before leaving office, enabling McAleenan
24 to take over, the unambiguous record shows otherwise. *See La Clínica de La Raza v. Trump*,
25 No. 19-4980, 2020 WL 4569462, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2020).
26

27 Moreover, even if Chad Wolf could have validly become the Acting Secretary, the period
28

1 during which the Secretary’s office could be filled by acting officials expired well before he
2 approved DHS’s new fee rule. Contrary to the Department’s position, the FVRA’s time limit on
3 acting service applies to officials who become Acting Secretary by virtue of the DHS order of
4 succession established under 6 U.S.C. § 113(g)(2).

5
6 Because Wolf unlawfully exercised the powers of a vacant office when he approved the
7 new fee rule, the FVRA demands that the rule “shall have no force or effect.” 5 U.S.C.
8 § 3348(d)(1). And because Wolf acted without legal authority, the Administrative Procedure Act
9 (APA) independently requires that the rule be set aside as “not in accordance with law” and “in
10 excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

11 ARGUMENT

12 **I. The FVRA Is a Critical Check on the Manipulation of Appointments by the** 13 **Executive Branch.**

14
15 “Article II of the Constitution requires that the President obtain ‘the Advice and Consent
16 of the Senate’ before appointing ‘Officers of the United States.’” *NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S.
17 Ct. 929, 934 (2017) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). The Framers imposed that
18 requirement as a check on the President, recognizing that giving him the “sole disposition of
19 offices” would result in a Cabinet “governed much more by his private inclinations and interests”
20 than by the public good. *The Federalist No. 76*, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
21 ed., 1961). Indeed, “the power of appointment to offices was deemed the most insidious and
22 powerful weapon of eighteenth century despotism,” and “[t]he manipulation of official
23 appointments had long been one of the American revolutionary generation’s greatest grievances
24 against executive power.” *Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue*, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991)
25 (quotation marks omitted).
26
27

28 Thus, “[t]he Senate’s advice and consent power is a critical ‘structural safeguard [] of the

1 constitutional scheme.” *SW Gen.*, 137 S. Ct. at 935 (quoting *Edmond v. United States*, 520 U.S.
2 651, 659 (1997)). And the Appointments Clause, “like all of the Constitution’s structural
3 provisions, is designed first and foremost not to look after the interests of the respective
4 branches, but to protect individual liberty.” *Id.* at 949 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quotation marks
5 omitted); see *Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico*, 140 S. Ct. at 1657 (“the
6 Appointments Clause helps to preserve democratic accountability”).

8 “Over the years, Congress has established a legislative scheme to protect the Senate’s
9 constitutional role in the confirmation process.” Morton Rosenberg, Cong. Research Serv.,
10 No. 98-892, *The New Vacancies Act: Congress Acts to Protect the Senate’s Confirmation*
11 *Prerogative*, at 5 (1998). Indeed, “[s]ince President Washington’s first term, Congress has given
12 the President limited authority to appoint acting officials to temporarily perform the functions of
13 a vacant . . . office without first obtaining Senate approval.” *SW Gen.*, 137 S. Ct. at 935; *Doolin*
14 *Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision*, 139 F.3d 203, 209-11 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

16 “[F]rom the beginning,” however, “Congress limited how long the President’s designee
17 could serve.” *Doolin*, 139 F.3d at 210; see, e.g., Act of Feb. 13, 1795, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 415, 415
18 (empowering the President to authorize persons “to perform the duties” of vacant offices, but
19 providing that “no one vacancy shall be supplied, in manner aforesaid, for a longer term than six
20 months”). In the 1860s, “Congress repealed the existing statutes on the subject of vacancies and
21 enacted in their stead a single statute,” the Vacancies Act, which has been in force since then,
22 with modifications. *Doolin*, 139 F.3d at 210. “The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 . . . is
23 the latest version of that authorization.” *SW Gen.*, 137 S. Ct. at 934.

26 Congress enacted the FVRA in response to the executive branch’s increasing refusal to
27 comply with the Vacancies Act and the Appointments Clause. Beginning in the 1970s, the
28

1 Justice Department took the position that the Vacancies Act was not “the exclusive statutory
2 authority for temporarily assigning the duties and powers of a Senate-confirmed office,” *The*
3 *Vacancies Act*, 22 Op. O.L.C. 44, 44 (1998), and that “statutes vesting an agency’s powers in the
4 agency head and allowing delegation to subordinate officials” could be used as an alternative
5 during a vacancy, enabling agencies to avoid complying with the limits of the Vacancies Act. *Id.*
6 Because virtually all federal departments are governed by such “vesting-and-delegation” statutes,
7 *id.* at 2, individuals “who were ineligible for appointment as acting officers under the terms of
8 the Vacancies Act were frequently ‘delegated’ the title and duties of precisely the same office,
9 meaning the act’s restrictions had become largely toothless.” Thomas A. Berry, *S.W. General:*
10 *The Court Reins in Unilateral Appointments*, 2017 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 151, 155.

13 Dismayed that “acting service beyond the time limitations in the act was widespread,” *id.*
14 at 154, Congress enacted the FVRA “to create a clear and exclusive process to govern the
15 performance of duties of offices in the Executive Branch that are filled through presidential
16 appointment by and with the consent of the Senate.” S. Rep. No. 105-250, at 1 (1998).
17 Accordingly, the FVRA carefully limits who may serve as an acting officer when a vacancy
18 arises. By default, the “first assistant” to the vacant office must perform the functions and duties
19 of that office. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). The President “may override that default rule by directing
20 [a different person] to become the acting officer instead,” *SW Gen.*, 137 S. Ct. at 935, but the
21 President’s choice of whom to select is limited. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2), (3).

24 Further, to prevent acting officers from filling vacancies for “constitutionally
25 unacceptable” periods of time, S. Rep. No. 105-250, at 8, the FVRA also limits the length of
26 their service. Relevant here, unless the President sends a nomination to the Senate to fill a
27 vacancy permanently, acting officials may perform the functions and duties of the vacant office
28

1 “for no longer than 210 days beginning on the date the vacancy occurs.” 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(1).
2 Once that period runs out, “the office shall remain vacant.” *Id.* § 3348(b)(1).

3 To encourage compliance with the FVRA’s mandates, Congress provided that an agency
4 action “shall have no force or effect” if it was taken by a person performing a function or duty of
5 a vacant office without authorization by the FVRA. *Id.* § 3348(d)(1). These void actions “may
6 not be ratified” by other officials. *Id.* § 3348(d)(2).

8 **II. Chad Wolf Is Violating the FVRA by Serving as Acting Secretary of Homeland** 9 **Security.**

10 In creating the office of DHS Secretary, Congress both incorporated and supplemented
11 the FVRA. Congress incorporated the FVRA by establishing a Deputy Secretary who “shall be
12 the Secretary’s first assistant for purposes of subchapter III of chapter 33 of Title 5,” which
13 includes the FVRA. 5 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)(A). Congress further incorporated the FVRA by
14 creating a third-in-line official, the Under Secretary for Management, who “shall be first
15 assistant to the Deputy Secretary . . . for purposes of subchapter III of chapter 33 of Title 5.” *Id.*
16 § 113(a)(1)(F).

17 Congress then departed from some of the FVRA’s rules concerning who may serve as
18 Acting Secretary during a vacancy. Under the FVRA, only the Secretary’s “first assistant” (i.e.,
19 the Deputy Secretary) would be able to serve by default as the Acting Secretary. *See* 5 U.S.C.
20 § 3345(a)(1). Congress modified this rule in DHS’s organic statute, establishing that, in the
21 absence of a Deputy, the Department’s third-in-line officer may serve as the Acting Secretary by
22 default: “Notwithstanding chapter 33 of Title 5, the Under Secretary for Management shall serve
23 as the Acting Secretary if by reason of absence, disability, or vacancy in office, neither the
24 Secretary nor Deputy Secretary is available to exercise the duties of the Office of the Secretary.”
25 6 U.S.C. § 113(g)(1). Congress also empowered the Department to establish a further line of
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1 default succession to fill the Secretary’s office when the top three positions are all vacant:
2 “Notwithstanding chapter 33 of Title 5, the Secretary may designate such other officers of the
3 Department in further order of succession to serve as Acting Secretary.” *Id.* § 113(g)(2).
4

5 Thus, DHS’s organic statute prescribes a specific order of succession that automatically
6 goes into effect when the Secretary’s office is vacant—first, Deputy Secretary, and then Under
7 Secretary for Management—and it empowers the Department to expand upon that list by
8 extending this default line of succession beyond those two officials in a further line of
9 succession. Executive Order 13753 currently provides that further line of succession. After the
10 Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretary for Management, the executive order lists sixteen
11 additional DHS officials who are empowered to take over as Acting Secretary in the sequence
12 provided. *See* Exec. Order No. 13753, § 1, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,667 (Dec. 9, 2016). The
13 Department’s internal regulation on vacancies incorporates this line of succession: “In case of
14 the Secretary’s . . . resignation, . . . the orderly succession of officials is governed by Executive
15 Order 13753.” DHS Delegation No. 00106 (Revision No. 08.5), *DHS Orders of Succession and*
16 *Delegations of Authorities for Named Positions*, § II.A (Apr. 10, 2019).²
17
18

19 In sum, the Department’s organic statute both incorporates and supplements the FVRA.
20 It incorporates the FVRA by relying on the Act’s “first assistant” rule as the means of
21 authorizing temporary service as Acting Secretary. 6 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)(A). And it supplements
22

23 ² When President Obama issued Executive Order 13753, DHS had not yet been given the
24 statutory power to establish a further line of succession for the Secretary’s office, and the
25 President’s authority to issue the executive order came from his discretionary power under the
26 FVRA to select specific officials to fill a vacancy. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2), (3). Soon after,
27 however, DHS’s organic statute was amended to add 6 U.S.C. § 113(g), which designates a third
28 in line for the Secretary’s office and allows DHS to establish a further line of succession.
Nevertheless, when DHS first exercised this new power in February 2020, it adopted the line of
succession provided in Executive Order 13753. *See* U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, B-331650,
Legality of Service of Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, at 5 (Aug. 14, 2020).

1 the FVRA by modifying this “first assistant” rule: contemplating the possibility that there will be
2 no first assistant, the statute allows other DHS officials to serve by default in lieu of the Deputy
3 Secretary when that position is unoccupied. *Id.* § 113(g). Through this arrangement, the statute
4 prevents unforeseen gaps in service in the Secretary’s office, avoiding the need for the President
5 to quickly select someone eligible to take over as Acting Secretary under the FVRA whenever a
6 vacancy arises and no first assistant is in place. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2), (3).

8 **A. Wolf Never Lawfully Became the Acting Secretary.**

9 Chad Wolf purportedly became the Acting Secretary of DHS by virtue of an order signed
10 by the previous Acting Secretary, Kevin McAleenan, shortly before McAleenan left government.
11 McAleenan himself, however, was never a valid Acting Secretary. He therefore had no power to
12 issue any such order, and his attempt to install Wolf as his successor is void and without effect.

14 The last Senate-confirmed DHS Secretary was Kirstjen Nielsen, who resigned in April
15 2019. At that point, Kevin McAleenan was the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
16 Protection (CBP). Under Executive Order 13753, the CBP Commissioner is *seventh* in line to
17 become Acting Secretary following a resignation. *See* Exec. Order No. 13753, *supra*, § 1.
18 Nevertheless, McAleenan purported to take over as Acting Secretary, even though other officials
19 higher in the line of succession were available to serve. In doing so, McAleenan departed from
20 the “further order of succession to serve as Acting Secretary,” 6 U.S.C. § 113(g)(2), that was set
21 forth in the executive order and in DHS’s internal regulation. And because he lacked authority
22 to serve under DHS’s organic statute, his tenure violated the FVRA, which is “the exclusive
23 means for temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties of any
24 office” unless an agency-specific statute like § 113(g)(2) applies. 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a).

27 Despite this clear-cut violation of the law, DHS has defended the validity of
28

1 McAleenan’s tenure (and by extension, Wolf’s) based on an order signed by Kirstjen Nielsen on
2 April 9, 2019. This order stated that it was revising Annex A to the internal DHS regulation that
3 provides the line of succession for the Department’s various offices. *See Memorandum for the*
4 *Secretary from John M. Mitnick, General Counsel*, at 1 (Apr. 9, 2019) (memorializing Nielsen’s
5 “approval of the attached document,” identified as “Annex A”); *id.* at 2 (the attached document,
6 which reads: “Annex A of DHS Orders of Succession and Delegations of Authorities for Named
7 Positions, Delegation No. 00106, is hereby amended by striking the text of such Annex in its
8 entirety and inserting the following in lieu thereof”). Notably, however, Annex A governs who
9 may exercise the Secretary’s powers during a disaster or catastrophic emergency, *not* who may
10 exercise the Secretary’s powers upon her resignation. *See* DHS Delegation No. 00106, *supra*,
11 § II.B (“I hereby delegate to the officials occupying the identified positions in the order listed
12 (Annex A), my authority to exercise the powers and perform the functions and duties of my
13 office . . . in the event I am unavailable to act during a disaster or catastrophic emergency.”).

14
15
16
17 The following day, DHS updated its internal regulation accordingly. Consistent with
18 Nielsen’s order, Annex A of the updated regulation now contained a new line of succession for
19 cases of “disaster or catastrophic emergency,” DHS Delegation No. 00106, *supra*, § II.B, which
20 matched the line of succession approved by Nielsen, *see id.*, Annex A. Also consistent with
21 Nielsen’s order, the updated regulation left intact the line of succession for cases involving “the
22 Secretary’s . . . resignation,” which were still “governed by Executive Order 13753.” *Id.* § II.A.
23 DHS claims that this was an “inadvertent, ministerial error” which failed to implement Nielsen’s
24 order correctly, *see* Mem. in Opp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Injunction at 26 n.10, *CASA de*
25 *Maryland v. Wolf*, No. 20-2118 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2020) (Dkt. No. 41) (hereinafter “*CASA de*
26 *Maryland PI Opp.*”), but DHS personnel did exactly what Nielsen’s order told them to do: they
27
28

1 replaced Annex A as directed, and made no other changes.

2 In short, Nielsen’s order and DHS’s subsequently revised internal regulation are
3 consistent with each other and perfectly clear: Nielsen altered the line of succession for cases of
4 disaster or catastrophic emergency, but she did not alter the line of succession for resignations,
5 which remained governed by Executive Order 13753. And under that executive order, Kevin
6 McAleenan was not entitled to become Acting Secretary when Nielsen resigned.
7

8 Contrary to these unambiguous documents, DHS claims that Nielsen established a new
9 line of succession for *all* scenarios, including cases of resignation, and that in doing so she
10 departed from the executive order. As DHS has put it: “On April 9, 2019, then-Secretary
11 Nielsen . . . establish[ed] the order of succession for the Secretary of Homeland Security. This
12 change to the order of succession applied to any vacancy [and it] superseded the FVRA and
13 the order of succession found in E.O. 13753.” 85 Fed. Reg. 46,804 (Aug. 3, 2020). That,
14 however, is simply not what Nielsen’s order says. Rather, it states: “I hereby designate the order
15 of succession for the Secretary of Homeland Security *as follows*.” *Memorandum for the*
16 *Secretary, supra*, at 2 (emphasis added). The only thing that “follows” is a change to the text of
17 Annex A, and that annex governs only vacancies during a disaster or catastrophic emergency.
18
19

20 Ultimately, DHS’s position requires adding text to Nielsen’s order that it does not contain
21 (language specifying that she was creating a single line of succession to govern all vacancies,
22 eschewing further reliance on Executive Order 13753), while ignoring text that the order *does*
23 contain (language specifying that the only change being made was to Annex A).³
24

25
26 ³ To supply the missing language, DHS has argued that it can be inferred from Nielsen’s
27 use of the term “order of succession.” *CASA de Maryland* PI Opp. at 26. But the use of that
28 term is not limited to situations in which an officer resigns or otherwise permanently leaves
office. *See, e.g.*, 6 U.S.C. § 113(g) (authorizing the Secretary to establish an “order of
succession” governing “[a]bsence, disability, or vacancy”). Indeed, DHS’s argument is

1 In reality, DHS is attempting to conflate what Secretary Nielsen did in April 2019 with
2 what Kevin McAleenan later purported to do in November of that year. That month, McAleenan
3 signed an order that ostensibly changed the Secretary’s line of succession. Unlike Nielsen,
4 however, McAleenan replaced the executive order with the line of succession set forth in
5 Annex A: “Section II.A of DHS Delegation No. 00106 . . . is amended hereby to state as follows:
6 ‘In case of the Secretary’s . . . resignation, . . . the order of succession of officials is governed by
7 Annex A.’” Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, *Amendment to the*
8 *Order of Succession for the Secretary of Homeland Security*, at 1 (Nov. 8, 2019). The
9 Department’s internal regulation was then changed accordingly. See DHS Delegation No. 00106
10 (Revision No. 08.6), *DHS Orders of Succession and Delegations of Authorities for Named*
11 *Positions*, § II.A (Nov. 14, 2019). This change was not the belated correction of a mistake made
12 seven months earlier, as DHS claims. Rather, as the record plainly shows, “McAleenan amended
13 Delegation No. 00106 . . . to cross-reference Annex A but Nielsen did not.” *La Clínica de La*
14 *Raza*, 2020 WL 4569462, at *14.

15
16
17
18 In sum, when the Secretary’s office became vacant in April, Executive Order 13753 still
19 prescribed who would serve as Acting Secretary following a resignation. *Id.* And for that
20 reason, no legal authority permitted Kevin McAleenan—who, again, was *seventh* in the line of
21 succession—to become the Acting Secretary.

22
23 Chad Wolf’s claim to be Acting Secretary, in turn, rests entirely on the November 2019
24 order signed by Kevin McAleenan. See 85 Fed. Reg. 46,804 (Aug. 3, 2020) (defending Wolf’s

25
26 self-contradictory: by DHS’s own account, the “order of succession” that Nielsen established in
27 April did not apply only to vacancies caused by resignations but rather “to any type of vacancy,”
28 including those caused by disasters or catastrophic emergencies. *CASA de Maryland* PI Opp. at
27. Thus, DHS acknowledges (as it must) that an “order of succession” can govern short-term
vacancies caused by an officer’s temporary unavailability due to disaster or emergency.

1 tenure on this basis alone). McAleenan’s November order elevated the Under Secretary for
2 Strategy, Policy, and Plans to be fourth in the line of succession. Days later, Wolf was
3 confirmed to that office. By virtue of holding that position, Wolf purported to become the new
4 Acting Secretary when McAleenan resigned from government the same day. But because
5 McAleenan served as the Acting Secretary illegally and without statutory authorization, the
6 official actions he took in that role “have no force or effect” under the FVRA. 5 U.S.C.
7 § 3348(d)(1). And that includes his attempt to install Wolf as the next Acting Secretary.⁴

8
9 **B. The FVRA’s Time Limits on Acting Service for the Secretary’s Office**
10 **Have Expired.**

11 Even if Chad Wolf could have validly become the Acting Secretary of Homeland
12 Security under the Department’s line of succession, any authority he might have had to perform
13 that role expired long before he approved the Department’s new fee rule.

14
15 The FVRA limits the amount of time during which a vacant office may be filled by an
16 acting official. Except in the case of vacancies caused by sickness, “the person serving as an
17 acting officer . . . may serve in the office . . . for no longer than 210 days beginning on the date
18 the vacancy occurs.” 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(1). This time limit is extended if the President
19 nominates someone to fill the office permanently, *id.* § 3346(a)(2), but in the absence of such a
20 nomination, the outer limit on acting service is 210 days from the beginning of the vacancy.
21

22
23 ⁴ Rejecting the government’s untenable reading of the DHS orders, one district court has
24 already held that McAleenan did not become Acting Secretary under DHS’s line of succession.
25 *See La Clínica de La Raza*, 2020 WL 4569462, at *14. That court went on, however, to hold that
26 McAleenan was eligible to be designated as Acting Secretary by the President under the FVRA.
27 *Id.* Notably, the court failed to address whether President Trump actually designated McAleenan
28 to perform that role under the FVRA, and DHS has never claimed that he did. More importantly,
if McAleenan *were* designated under the FVRA, then the FVRA’s time limits unquestionably
applied to his tenure as Acting Secretary. That, in turn, would make Chad Wolf’s tenure illegal,
because the 210-day time limit for acting service expired before McAleenan approved the order
that purported to make Wolf his successor.

1 After that period expires, “the office shall remain vacant.” *Id.* § 3348(b)(1). The office of DHS
2 Secretary became vacant no later than April 10, 2019, and because President Trump had not
3 nominated anyone to fill the office, the FVRA’s time limits for the office expired no later than
4 November 6, 2019.

5
6 In response to this objection, DHS has argued that the FVRA’s time limits do not apply
7 to the Secretary’s office. The Department points to the provision in DHS’s organic statute that
8 allows it to designate a “further order of succession to serve as Acting Secretary” beyond the
9 Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretary for Management. 6 U.S.C. § 113(g)(2). According to
10 DHS, this provision displaces the entire FVRA—not merely its rules affecting *who* may serve as
11 the Acting Secretary, but also its time limits on acting service. *See* 85 Fed. Reg. 46,804 (Aug. 3,
12 2020) (asserting that DHS’s designation of an order of succession under § 113(g)(2) “superseded
13 the FVRA” and that Kevin McAleenan therefore “served as Acting Secretary without time
14 limitation”).
15

16
17 The implication of this argument is that DHS may operate indefinitely without ever
18 having a Senate-confirmed Secretary. Because no time limits on acting service apply to the
19 Secretary’s office, and because DHS itself can modify its line of succession at will, a series of
20 Acting Secretaries can run the Department in perpetuity. Not only that, but these Acting
21 Secretaries can choose their own successors, as long as the offices of Deputy Secretary and
22 Under Secretary for Management remain vacant. Before leaving office, all a departing Secretary
23 has to do is revise the line of succession, as Kevin McAleenan did, to put his chosen replacement
24 at the top of the list. Moreover, the individuals who make up this chain of Acting Secretaries
25 need not have been confirmed by the Senate to *any* position in DHS. That is because § 113(g)(2)
26 permits any “officers of the Department” to be included in the Secretary’s line of succession, not
27
28

1 merely those whose offices require Senate confirmation. In short, a self-perpetuating sequence
2 of Acting Secretaries, some of whom may have been selected for their underlying positions in
3 the Department without presidential nomination or Senate confirmation, may run the Department
4 indefinitely.

5
6 Even if such a system were constitutional,⁵ it is plainly impermissible under the relevant
7 statutes, which preserve the FVRA’s time limits on acting service for the Secretary’s office.

8 Far from displacing the FVRA entirely, DHS’s organic statute explicitly *incorporates* the
9 FVRA. It does so by providing that the Deputy Secretary “shall be the Secretary’s first assistant
10 for purposes of subchapter III of chapter 33 of Title 5,” 6 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)(A), and by similarly
11 providing that the Under Secretary for Management “shall be first assistant to the Deputy
12 Secretary of Homeland Security for purposes of subchapter III of chapter 33 of Title 5,” *id.*
13 § 113(a)(1)(F). If DHS were correct that § 113 displaces all of the FVRA, these two provisions
14 would become “a complete nullity.” *New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey*, 447 U.S. 54, 62
15 (1980). “It is, however, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that [courts] must ‘give
16 effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’” *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 404
17 (2000) (quoting *United States v. Menasche*, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).

18
19 Moreover, none of the conceivable bases for DHS’s interpretation withstands scrutiny.
20 To start, DHS has pointed out that § 113(g)(2) permits the Secretary to designate a further order
21 of succession “[n]otwithstanding chapter 33 of Title 5.” 6 U.S.C. § 113(g)(2). Because chapter
22 33 of Title 5 includes the entire FVRA (in addition to other provisions), the Department argues
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24

25 ⁵ Courts have held that “the temporary nature” of acting service is what prevents it from
26 violating the Appointments Clause. *United States v. Smith*, 962 F.3d 755, 765 (4th Cir. 2020);
27 see *United States v. Eaton*, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (“Because the subordinate officer is
28 charged with the performance of the duty of the superior for a limited time, and under special
and temporary conditions, he is not thereby transformed into the superior and permanent
official.”).

1 that this “notwithstanding” clause displaces the FVRA’s time limits for Acting Secretaries who
2 are serving pursuant to a further order of succession under § 113(g)(2).

3 This argument, however, misinterprets the meaning of the word “notwithstanding.” That
4 word “shows which provision prevails *in the event of a clash.*” *SW Gen.*, 137 S. Ct. at 939
5 (quoting Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts*
6 (126-27 (2012)) (emphasis added); *id.* (“The ordinary meaning of ‘notwithstanding’ is ‘in spite
7 of,’ or ‘without prevention or obstruction from or by.’” (quoting dictionaries)). “A
8 ‘notwithstanding’ clause,” in short, “just shows which of two or more provisions prevails in the
9 event of a conflict.” *Id.* at 940. When two provisions do not conflict, there is nothing for a
10 “notwithstanding” clause to resolve. Here, there is no conflict between § 113(g)(2) and the
11 FVRA’s time limits: nothing in § 113(g)(2) addresses how long Acting Secretaries may serve or
12 refers to time limits at all. And Congress knows how to address such matters when it wants to.
13 *See, e.g.*, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(2) (permitting officer to serve “until a successor has been
14 appointed and qualified”).

15 Nor is there any implicit conflict between the two statutes. Section 113(g)(2) permits
16 DHS officers to serve as Acting Secretary by default even though they are not the “first
17 assistant” to the Secretary’s office—an arrangement that the FVRA would otherwise forbid, *see*
18 5 U.S.C. § 3345. Allowing such officers to serve automatically as Acting Secretary does not
19 conflict with the FVRA’s imposition of a time limit on how long they may serve. And “when
20 two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
21 congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” *J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.*
22 *Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.*, 534 U.S. 124, 143-44 (2001) (quoting *Morton v. Mancari*, 417 U.S.
23 535, 551 (1974)).

1 To appreciate just how untenable DHS’s position is, recall that § 113(a)(1)(A), which
2 addresses acting service by the Deputy Secretary, does not contain a “notwithstanding” clause or
3 supersede any part of the FVRA. To the contrary, it incorporates the FVRA by designating the
4 Deputy Secretary as the “first assistant” to the Secretary’s office for FVRA purposes. 6 U.S.C.
5 § 113(a)(1)(A). There is no conceivable textual basis, therefore, for claiming that a Deputy
6 Secretary who is serving as the Acting Secretary is exempt from the FVRA’s time limits. But
7 although the Senate-confirmed Deputy Secretary is clearly bound by those time limits, DHS
8 insists that lower-level, non-Senate-confirmed officers who are listed in an order of succession
9 that the Department can revise at will are permitted to serve as Acting Secretary “without time
10 limitation.” 85 Fed. Reg. 46,804 (Aug. 3, 2020). To state the proposition is to refute it.

13 This conclusion is especially obvious because the very legislation that created subsection
14 § 113(g)(2)—indeed, the very same section of that legislation—*increased* the statute’s reliance
15 on the FVRA. Previously, § 113 identified the Under Secretary for Management as one of the
16 Department’s Senate-confirmed officers but said nothing more about that position. *See* 6 U.S.C.
17 § 113(a)(1)(F) (2016). In the same legislation that added subsection (g) to § 113, Congress also
18 amended subsection (a)(1)(F), inserting the text that makes this position the “first assistant” to
19 the Deputy Secretary for FVRA purposes. *See* Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1903(a), 130 Stat. 2000,
20 2672 (Dec. 23, 2016). The fact that Congress further incorporated the FVRA into the framework
21 of § 113 forecloses any argument that Congress meant to displace the FVRA in its entirety.

24 Nor does the FVRA itself support the Department’s position. The FVRA’s time limits
25 apply to every “person serving as an acting officer as described under section 3345.” 5 U.S.C.
26 § 3346(a). DHS has argued that when acting officials serve as Secretary under its order of
27 succession, they serve “not pursuant to the FVRA and its 210-day timeline, but instead pursuant
28

1 to 6 U.S.C. § 113(g)(2).” *CASA de Maryland* PI Opp. at 27. But that dichotomy is false: an
2 Acting Secretary serves pursuant to *both* statutes, which are not rivals but rather complementary
3 parts of an interlocking scheme.

4
5 As explained above, under the Department’s organic statute, the Deputy Secretary is the
6 “first assistant” to the Secretary *for purposes of the FVRA*. 6 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)(A). In other
7 words, subsection (a)(1)(A) incorporates the FVRA’s “first assistant” rule as the means of
8 authorizing temporary service as Acting Secretary. Subsection (g) then modifies the “first
9 assistant” rule, accounting for the possible absence of a first assistant by permitting automatic
10 service, without presidential involvement, by other officers. While this arrangement departs
11 from what the FVRA would otherwise allow, it is ultimately an extension of the “first assistant”
12 rule, which is triggered in the first instance when a vacancy arises. 6 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)(A).

13
14 Thus, a Deputy Secretary who takes the reins during a vacancy is clearly “serving as an
15 acting officer as described under section 3345,” 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a), which is the section
16 containing the FVRA’s first assistant rule. And that means the FVRA’s time limits
17 unquestionably apply. Imposing those limits on a Senate-confirmed Deputy Secretary, while
18 exempting lower-level officials chosen unilaterally by the agency, would be an “absurd” result.
19 *Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas*, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2462 (2019). And as a textual
20 matter, it requires ignoring the connections among the three relevant provisions of § 113: Under
21 subsection (a)(1)(A), Deputy Secretaries are first in line, due to their position as “first assistant”
22 to the Secretary. But if there is no Deputy Secretary available, subsection (g)(1) permits the
23 Under Secretary for Management to step in. And if no Under Secretary is available either, then
24 the further order of succession established under subsection (g)(2) fills out the scheme. The
25 three provisions work with each other, and with the FVRA, to form a single unified sequence.
26
27
28

1 The only other textual support DHS has cited for its view comes from 5 U.S.C. § 3347.
2 Under that section, the FVRA is generally “the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an
3 acting official to perform the functions and duties of any office,” but it becomes non-exclusive if
4 another statute “expressly” provides for the filling of an office “temporarily in an acting
5 capacity.” *Id.* § 3347(a). According to DHS, because Section 113(g) permits certain officials to
6 fill the Secretary’s office by default when there is no first assistant, “[t]he FVRA is not the
7 exclusive scheme for acting service.” *CASA de Maryland* PI Opp. at 27.
8

9 That, however, does not answer the real question, which is whether this non-exclusivity,
10 standing alone, erases the FVRA’s limits on how long an acting official may serve. There is no
11 reason to think that it does. The FVRA does not suggest that its time limits vanish whenever
12 another statute provides a supplementary means of selecting an acting officer. On the contrary, it
13 says that statutes like § 113(g)(2) may be used only to designate someone “to perform the
14 functions and duties of a specified office *temporarily*.” 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1)(A) (emphasis
15 added). According to DHS, however, the Department may utilize § 113(g)(2) to designate
16 someone to perform those functions and duties “without time limitation.” 85 Fed. Reg. 46,804
17 (Aug. 3, 2020). Nothing in the FVRA or in the Department’s organic statute supports that
18 interpretation.
19
20

21 **III. Because Chad Wolf Is Not Validly Serving as Acting Secretary, The Fee Rule Is**
22 **Void and Must Be Set Aside.**

23 **A. The Fee Rule Is Void Under the FVRA.**

24 The FVRA imposes severe penalties on certain violations of its limits. If “any person”
25 who is not validly filling a vacant office under the FVRA performs any “function or duty” of that
26 office, this person’s actions “shall have no force or effect.” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(1). Such actions
27 also “may not be ratified.” *Id.* § 3348(d)(2). For purposes of these penalties, the FVRA defines
28

1 a “function or duty” as including “any function or duty of the applicable office that is established
2 by statute and is required by statute to be performed by the applicable officer (and only that
3 officer.” *Id.* § 3348(a)(2)(A) (punctuation and headings omitted).

4
5 Approving DHS’s new fee rule is the type of function that is “required by statute to be
6 performed by the [DHS Secretary] (and only that officer.” *Id.* “The Secretary is the head of the
7 Department and shall have direction, authority, and control over it.” 6 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2). The
8 Secretary is also “[r]esponsible for . . . [e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies
9 and priorities,” *id.* § 202(5), and is “charged with the administration and enforcement of . . . all
10 . . . laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Only
11 one other Department official could plausibly have the necessary authority—the Director of
12 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). *See* 6 U.S.C. § 271(a)(3). Currently,
13 however, the Director’s office is vacant, and the FVRA’s time limits for an Acting Director have
14 expired.⁶ In that situation, the FVRA directs that “only the head of such Executive agency may
15 perform any function or duty of such office.” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b)(2). This road, therefore, leads
16 back to the Secretary.

17
18
19 To resist the application of § 3348, DHS has elsewhere argued (unsuccessfully) that the
20 term “function or duty” in that section “includes only ‘non-delegable duties’—that is, only those
21 duties . . . that may not be reassigned.” *L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli*, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 31 (D.D.C.
22 2020) (quoting brief). And working from that premise, DHS has put forth the sweeping view

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24
25 ⁶ The Department has acknowledged that USCIS currently has no Director or Acting
26 Director. In its filings with the Government Accountability Office, DHS has reported that Ken
27 Cuccinelli’s tenure as Acting Director of USCIS ended on December 28, 2019, which was 210
28 days after the vacancy began on June 1, 2019. *See* U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Federal Vacancies Reform Act, <https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/federal-vacancies-reform-act> (search for the position title of “Director” within the agency “Department of Homeland Security” and the sub-agency “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services”).

1 that no action performed by anyone in the Department can ever be void under § 3348(d). That
2 view is based on the “vesting and delegation” provision of DHS’s organic statute, which vests
3 the Secretary with the functions of all DHS personnel and generally permits delegation of the
4 Secretary’s functions to other Department personnel. 6 U.S.C. § 112(a)(3), (b)(1). In other
5 words, as DHS sees it, this vesting-and-delegation statute makes every function of the
6 Department “delegable,” which in turn means that no function is assigned by statute to a single
7 officer “and only that officer.” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2)(A)(ii). And that, in turn, means that no
8 action carried out by *any* DHS official can be subject to § 3348’s penalties.
9

10
11 The implications do not stop there. “[E]very cabinet-level department has some version
12 of [the Department’s] vesting and delegation statutes.” *L.M.-M.*, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 31
13 (quotation marks omitted); *see id.* n.11 (listing statutes). And so “the logic of this position would
14 cover all (or almost all) departments subject to the FVRA,” *id.*, even though “[i]t was the
15 pervasive use of those vesting-and-delegation statutes” to avoid vacancies legislation “that
16 convinced Congress of the need to enact the FVRA” in the first place, *id.* at 34; *see supra* at 4-5.
17 Thus, “the mere fact that a department head is also vested with all functions specifically vested
18 in other department officers and employees cannot, standing alone, defeat the enforcement
19 mechanisms found in the FVRA’s vacant-office provision.” *Id.* at 32.
20

21 In sum, when Chad Wolf approved the new fee rule, he “perform[ed]” a “function or duty
22 of a vacant office” to which the FVRA applies, and because he did so without legal authority
23 under the FVRA, his actions “have no force or effect.” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(1).
24

25 **B. The Fee Rule Must Be Set Aside Under the APA.**

26 Even if the unique penalties of 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d) did not apply here, Wolf’s approval of
27 the new fee rule still violated the substantive restrictions set forth in the previous sections of the
28

1 FVRA. And when a person’s tenure as an acting officer violates the FVRA, agency actions
2 taken by that person are “not in accordance with law” and therefore must be “set aside” under the
3 APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); *see L.M.-M.*, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 34 (“The Court . . . is also
4 persuaded by Plaintiffs’ alternative theory—that, because Cuccinelli was exercising the authority
5 of the USCIS Director in violation of the FVRA, the directives were not issued ‘in accordance
6 with law,’ and must, accordingly, be set aside under the APA.”).

8 Significantly, therefore, actions taken by an illegally serving official must be set aside
9 under the APA even if the function in question is not assigned exclusively to the vacant office.
10 While 5 U.S.C. § 3348 provides that a “function or duty” of a vacant office is—for *purposes of*
11 *that section*—limited to those “required by statute [or regulation] to be performed by the
12 applicable officer (and only that officer),” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2), the meaning of “functions and
13 duties” under the rest of the FVRA is broader. The text makes this clear: Section 3348
14 explicitly states that its narrower definition of that term applies only “[i]n this section.” *Id.*
15 § 3348(a). That definition, therefore, governs the use of this term only for purposes of whether
16 the penalties in § 3348 apply. It does not govern the meaning of “functions and duties” in the
17 rest of the Act.

18 The FVRA uses phrases like “in this section” with precision and intent, as the Supreme
19 Court has explained:

20 Now add “under this section.” The language clarifies that subsection (b)(1)
21 applies to all persons serving under § 3345. Congress often drafts statutes with
22 hierarchical schemes—section, subsection, paragraph, and on down the line.
23 Congress used that structure in the FVRA and relied on it to make precise cross-
24 references. When Congress wanted to refer only to a particular subsection or
25 paragraph, it said so.

26 *SW Gen.*, 137 S. Ct. at 938-39 (citations omitted). By specifying that § 3348’s definition of
27 “function or duty” applies only “[i]n this section,” Congress “ma[d]e [a] precise cross-
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1 reference[],” *SW Gen.*, 137 S. Ct. at 939, to clarify that this definition does not apply elsewhere
2 in the FVRA.

3 The upshot is that demonstrating a violation of § 3345, § 3346, or § 3347 does not require
4 showing that the challenged action was, by statute or regulation, an action which “only that
5 officer” could take. 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2). This means that the action can be illegal, and
6 therefore grounds for invalidation under the APA, even if it is not an action that is exclusively
7 assigned to the vacant office. Thus, the normal remedies for unlawful agency action under the
8 APA remain available even when the unique penalties of § 3348 do not apply.

9 The D.C. Circuit explained this point in *SW General*. The court concluded that an
10 official who took a challenged action was illegally serving in violation of the FVRA, but it also
11 concluded that § 3348 did not apply because the office in question was expressly exempt from
12 that section. *See SW Gen., Inc. v. NLRB*, 796 F.3d 67, 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The court
13 therefore proceeded on the assumption that, “in the event of an FVRA violation,” the
14 inapplicability of § 3348 made the challenged action “voidable, not void,” and therefore subject
15 to invalidation under the APA. *Id.* at 79, 80-81. Endorsing this analysis, the Ninth Circuit has
16 reached the same conclusion. *Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., Inc.*, 816 F.3d 550, 564
17 (9th Cir. 2016).

18 In short, regardless of whether § 3348 applies, an official violates the rest of the FVRA
19 by exercising the powers of a vacant office without complying with the Act’s restrictions on
20 acting service. Because such actions are “not in accordance with law” and are “in excess of
21 statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,” this Court must “hold [them] unlawful and set
22 [them] aside” under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C).

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Wolf’s approval of the fee rule as the Department’s Acting Secretary violated 5 U.S.C.

1 § 3345 because he was not eligible to serve as Acting Secretary under that provision. His action
2 violated 5 U.S.C. § 3346 because, by August 2020, no one could serve as Acting Secretary under
3 that provision. And because Wolf had no right to serve as Acting Secretary under either
4 provision, his approval violated 5 U.S.C. § 3347, which makes those two provisions “the
5 exclusive means” for authorizing someone to exercise the powers of a vacant office, *id.*
6 § 3347(a), unless that person is validly serving under an agency-specific succession statute—
7 which Wolf was not. Under the APA, therefore, Wolf’s “unlawful” actions must be “set aside.”
8
9 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

10
11 **CONCLUSION**

12 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.

13 Dated: September 9, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

14 *Elizabeth B. Wydra*

15 Elizabeth B. Wydra (Bar No. 218200)

16 ELIZABETH B. WYDRA

17 BRIANNE J. GOROD

BRIAN R. FRAZELLE

18 CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER

19 1200 18th Street NW, Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036

20 (202) 296-6889

elizabeth@theusconstitution.org

21 *Counsel for Amicus Curiae*

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 I hereby certify that on September 9, 2020, the foregoing document was filed with the
3 Clerk of the Court, using the CM/ECF system, causing it to be served on all counsel of record.
4

5 Dated: September 9, 2020

6 Elizabeth B. Wydra
Elizabeth B. Wydra

7 *Counsel for Amicus Curiae*
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