Agency Rulemaking: Unnecessary Delegation or Indispensable Assistance?
Event description authored by host organization. Information here does not necessarily reflect the views of CAC and may not be up to date — please refer to RSVP link for the latest information.
In his recent article, “Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come to Generate Environmental Law Without Congress,” published in the Texas A&M Law Review, Donald Kochan lays out the argument that delegation of authority to agencies serves the interests of both sides of Congress. Those ostensibly elected to oppose further regulation can argue that any proposed rule changes are out of their control. Conversely, representatives elected to increase regulation can blame agency heads for not following the intent of the authorizing statute. However, both sides avoid blame by the electorate.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of such a system? Should specialized bureaucrats do the lion’s share of rulemaking? Or should elected Senators and Congressman, often without the same level of expertise, write the rules that govern our nation?
Please join us Thursday, June 18th for a panel discussion of these essential questions, sponsored by the Article I Initiative and the Regulatory Transparency Project.
Andrew Grossman, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP and Adjunct Scholar, The Cato Institute
Prof. Donald Kochan, Professor in Law and the Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law
Prof. Robert Percival, Professor of Law and Director, Environmental Law Program, University of Maryland School of Law
Brianne Gorod, Chief Counsel, Constitutional Accountability Center
Moderator: Jeff Holmstead, Partner, Bracewell LLP