Damian Stinnie, like many other Virginians, had his driver’s license suspended without the opportunity for a hearing. Stinnie, along with others, challenged the law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that it violated their right to due process. A Virginia federal district court issued a preliminary injunction, and Virginia then repealed the law before litigation could continue. The case was ultimately dismissed as moot.

Under 42 U.S.C. §1988, Stinnie and the other plaintiffs are eligible for fees to compensate them for the costs of securing this victory if they are the “prevailing party” in the litigation. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were the “prevailing party,” but the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles asked the Supreme Court to hear the case, and the Court agreed to do so.

CAC filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in support of the plaintiffs. Our brief argued that the meaning of “prevailing party” is simple—it is the party that succeeds. And by all reasonable measures, Stinnie and his co-plaintiffs were successful in this case. Our brief made three principal points in support of this position.

First, whether “prevailing party” is given the ordinary meaning those words had in 1976, or whether it is understood to be a term of art, the result is the same: a “prevailing” party was simply a party that succeeded in achieving the goals of its litigation, or a portion of those goals. Contrary to the position of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, our brief argued that there is no support for the claim that prevailing-party status required “a conclusive ruling on the merits or a final judgment.”

Second, Congress amended Section 1988 to provide for attorney’s fees against a backdrop of judicial decisions that interpreted the term “prevailing party” in other fee-shifting statutes. By using this familiar term in Section 1988, Congress incorporated its settled meaning. Under those decisions, a “prevailing” party was simply a party that succeeded in achieving its desired outcome in a case. Success could take many forms and did not require a final judgment or conclusive ruling on the merits. This broad view of prevailing-party status was consistently applied in cases that, like this one, became moot after plaintiffs achieved their litigation goals.

Third, in passing Section 1988, Congress adopted the ordinary meaning and well-established judicial interpretation of “prevailing party.” Demonstrating a thorough knowledge of the existing judicial standards construing “prevailing party” in other statutes, Congress expected that courts applying Section 1988 would be guided by that case law. And citing that case law, Congress was clear that the term “prevailing party” did not require a final judgment following a full trial on the merits. This broad interpretation effectuated Congress’s plan when adopting civil rights fee-shifting provisions: to enable and encourage plaintiffs injured by civil rights cases to seek judicial relief—often not possible, without an award of attorney’s fees.

In February 2025, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff drivers do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under Section 1988. The Court held that preliminary injunctions cannot make a party “prevailing” because they do not “conclusively resolve legal disputes” and indicate only if a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented. Echoing our brief, the dissent explained that categorically precluding fee awards for plaintiffs who have successfully obtained preliminary injunctive relief “lacks any basis in the text of §1988(b) and is plainly inconsistent with that statutory provision’s clear objective, which is to encourage attorneys to file civil rights actions on behalf of the most vulnerable people in our society.” Citing both dictionary definitions and Supreme Court precedent, Justice Jackson concluded that “for fee-shifting purposes, it is possible to prevail based on a preliminary ruling.”