Until February 2025, Megan Jackler and Brandon Jaroch were Immigration Judges (IJs) charged with “conduct[ing] specified classes of proceedings” involving immigration law. They were abruptly terminated in violation of federal civil service law, which provides that IJs can only be removed for cause and with at least 30 days’ advance written notice. When Jackler and Jaroch invoked these protections before the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Trump administration advanced a novel claim—that because IJs are “officers of the United States,” Congress cannot impose any limitations on the Attorney General’s authority to remove them. The Board agreed, and the IJs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which agreed to hear the case en banc. In July 2026, the Constitutional Accountability Center filed an amicus brief in support of the IJs. Our brief explains why the Trump administration’s argument is at odds with the text and history of the Constitution, as well as centuries of historical practice.

First, the Board relied on the argument that IJs are inferior officers, but the executive does not possess limitless power of removal over those officers. The Constitution gives Congress great flexibility in determining how best to shape the federal government, as well as a unique authority over inferior officers. In the nation’s early years, legislators recognized that Congress’s authority to create inferior offices and provide for their appointment necessitated control over their removal. Even lawmakers who contended that the President should have an inherent power to remove high-level officials agreed that Congress had authority to regulate the removal of inferior officers—it was widely assumed that any presidential power of removal extended only to officers appointed by the President.

Second, Congress has regulated the appointment and removal of inferior officers since the Founding. In the early republic, both Congress and the President seemed to understand that the president’s removal power was something to be granted—it had to be specified or it did not exist. As the nineteenth century progressed, Congress began explicitly regulating removals more frequently. And in the era after the Civil War, Congress tackled the “spoils system,” when public offices were corruptly doled out by political parties. It reformed the civil service to promote greater independence from party politics, and it began to protect inferior officers from arbitrary or politically-motivated removal.

Finally, the Supreme Court has confirmed Congress’s power to govern the removal of inferior officers and employees. As early as 1886, the Court explained that Congress has the power to “limit and restrict the power of removal as it deem[ed] best for the public interest” in the case of inferior officers. For over a century afterwards, the Court repeatedly held that Congress controls removals in the case of inferior executive officers. While the Supreme Court recently overruled the precedent holding that Congress can create “expert agencies led by a group of principal officers removable by the President only for good cause,” it relied on historical evidence that specifically addresses the removal of high-level officers and explicitly declined to “determine the fate of officials not before [it].” Its decision provides no basis for extending that removal power to inferior officers supervised by the Attorney General.