In 1980, Congress required the executive branch to establish a process for any person physically present in the country or at a port of entry to seek asylum. It also prohibited government officials from sending noncitizens to places where their “life or freedom would be threatened.” This guarantee is now reflected in a statutory mandate that immigration officers “shall . . . inspect[]” certain noncitizens who are “present in the United States . . . or who arrive[] in the United States . . . at a designated port of arrival.” The goal of these provisions was to make sure that the government would not force people with potentially-valid asylum claims back to countries in which they faced persecution without first considering their claims.

The federal government has nonetheless instituted a policy that turns away people who are trying to present themselves at ports of entry to seek asylum. According to the government, the laws protecting asylum-seekers do not apply to noncitizens who arrive at a port of entry but are blocked from entering the country by immigration officers just before they step over the border. It argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality, which provides that laws generally be construed to only apply within the borders of the United States, allows them to ignore the law if an asylum seeker is not technically on U.S. soil. A coalition of immigrants’ rights organizations sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. That court held that the policy was unlawful, and after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, the government asked the Supreme Court to hear the case.

In February 2026, CAC filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court explaining why the government’s arguments are wrong.

First, the presumption against extraterritoriality is mainly concerned with ensuring that statutes do not reach beyond the authority of the United States. The presumption’s history makes clear that when a nation does have authority over an area, there is no reason to presume that the nation’s laws do not apply there. Centuries of Supreme Court precedent emphasize the role of jurisdiction, authority, and control in determining when a nation’s laws apply. The relevant question was not whether a dispute occurred in one location or another, but whether it fell under the United States’s authority and control.

Second, this case involves an application of U.S. law to interactions between border officials standing on U.S. soil and asylum-seekers at ports of entry—clearly the subject of the United States’s authority. For decades, the federal government has exercised authority and control over not only asylum-seekers within the country, but also those “attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” In addition, modern U.S. asylum law stems from the country’s international-law obligations toward asylum-seekers. As the Supreme Court has made clear, these obligations should be a key part of determining the law’s reach. For example, nearly 200 years ago, the Supreme Court held that Congress could punish piracy overseas, because Congress had universal jurisdiction over piracy under international law.

Finally, applying the federal law’s protections to asylum-seekers at ports of entry is consistent with the text and history of the relevant provisions. The Immigration and Nationality Act states that an “alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)” can apply for asylum—making clear people at such ports “arrive[] in” the United States. And the history of that provision demonstrates that Congress explicitly planned to regulate border officials in their interactions with asylum-seekers at ports of entry, no matter what side of the border the asylum-seekers stood on during the encounter.