WASHINGTON, DC – Following oral argument at the Supreme Court this morning in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, a case in which the Court is considering whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Constitutional Accountability Center Senior Appellate Counsel Miriam Becker-Cohen issued the following reaction:

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) protects the free exercise rights of people incarcerated in federally funded prisons. It gives them an express cause of action against state officers to vindicate those rights.

Five years ago, in Tanzin v. Tanvir, the Supreme Court held that nearly identical statutory text authorizing “appropriate relief” against state officers included damages. And just two years ago, in Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County v. Talevski, the Court held that individuals may privately enforce federal rights conferred by Spending Clause statutes just like those rights conferred by any other statute.

Put those principles together and today’s case should be a simple one. As Justice Jackson explained, echoing our brief, it would be difficult for the Court to hold that damages are not available in this case without calling into question numerous important precedents, including Talevski and other cases involving the Spending Clause. And again, echoing our brief, she explained that to the extent the Court invokes a contract law analogy here to interpret RLUIPA, it should do so cautiously without importing contract law wholesale.

The bottom line here is that if the Court rules for the Louisiana Corrections Department, it will leave Mr. Landor with no meaningful remedy for an egregious and conceded substantive RLUIPA violation. Neither RLUIPA nor Spending Clause doctrine permit that result.