In 2019, based on an overwhelming scientific and professional consensus that trying to change someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity can cause serious harm, Colorado joined 23 other states and the District of Columbia in prohibiting mental health professionals from practicing “conversion therapy” on children. Kaley Chiles is a licensed counselor in Colorado who, despite the consensus in her professional field that “conversion therapy” is harmful, wants to practice it on children in the state. She challenged Colorado’s law in court, arguing that therapy is purely a form of speech and therefore Colorado cannot, under the First Amendment, regulate how she treats clients.  

In August 2025, CAC filed an amicus brief in support of Colorado. Our brief explains why the ban on “conversion therapy” for children is constitutional. 

Advice and treatment provided by professionals have long been treated differently than private speech. Professionals—like lawyers, doctors, and psychologists—are paid by clients for their professional judgment. Clients rely on professionals to give them good advice and professionals have an ethical obligation to provide it. Because clients cannot evaluate the quality of this advice on their own, states have long stepped in to protect those who seek advice or treatment from professionals from incompetent or unprofessional advice. States routinely regulate what professionals can say to their clients in a way that would be unconstitutional, under the First Amendment, for conversations between two private individuals. For example, even though a state cannot require someone to get a license to speak in public, governments generally require professionals to be licensed before they can give advice or offer treatment. And though there is generally no such thing as a “false idea” in public discourse under the First Amendment, there is such a thing as bad professional advice, which states can penalize through malpractice liability. And, in the professional context, states can compel disclosures to protect their clients even though a government usually cannot force individuals to speak in public.  

The Supreme Court has long recognized this. Its precedents treat professional advice, given in the context of the professional-client relationship and tailored to the individualized needs of a particular client, differently than a professional’s private speech.  And it has allowed states, pursuant to their traditional police power and interest in ensuring the health and welfare of their residents, to regulate how professionals speak to and treat their clients. 

Colorado’s ban on conversion therapy targets precisely the type of treatment by professionals that states have a strong interest in, and long history of, regulating. It does not interfere with the marketplace of ideas protected by the First Amendment. Chiles, like anyone else, can advocate for “conversion therapy,” make the case that it is within professional norms, and try to convince the Colorado legislature to repeal its ban. But the First Amendment does not allow courts to override the judgment of the Colorado legislature that the treatment Chiles wishes to provide is outside the bounds of professional norms and threatens to harm Colorado’s children.