Kekai Watanabe was brutally attacked in a federal prison and sustained severe injuries, including a broken tailbone. Visibly injured, he requested medical attention for his severe back pain. Francis Nielsen, a federal prison nurse, told him “to stop being a cry baby” and refused to send Watanabe to a hospital or provide any medical care besides over-the-counter pain medication. When Watanabe finally received an x-ray seven months later, the scan revealed that his tailbone was in fact broken and that pieces of it had “migrated and entered the surrounding soft tissue.” Watanabe then sued Nielsen for violating the Eighth Amendment by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical injuries. After the district court dismissed his case, Watanabe appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed and allowed the case to proceed. Nielsen then asked the Supreme Court to hear the case, and the Court agreed to do so. In September 2026, CAC filed an amicus brief in support of Watanabe.

The Constitution’s text and history make clear that individuals can sue in federal court to hold federal officers accountable for violating their constitutionally guaranteed rights, as the Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

Under Article III, federal courts have broad power to protect constitutional rights and prevent abuse of power by the government. This sweeping grant of judicial authority was incorporated into the Constitution against the backdrop of a common-law tradition that recognized legal rights are meaningless if individuals lack the ability to go to court to obtain a remedy when a right is violated. The Supreme Court confirmed this understanding in Marbury v. Madison, when Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed that “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.”

The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, was adopted to guard against a government able to impose punishment without limits. Fears about untrammeled government punishment were especially acute in the context of prisons, where English commentators warned of the risk of “secret tyranny.” By the time of the Founding, English common law made clear that prison officials bore a duty of care toward the prisoners in their custody and were obliged to protect their health and safety. And English courts enforced that duty against derelict prison officials through fines, removal from office, orders to improve prison conditions, and criminal prosecution.

Supreme Court cases like Bivens and Carlson v. Green, which applied Bivens damages remedies to constitutional violations by federal prison officials, properly reflect longstanding judicial practice. Courts in the Founding generation vindicated core rights by granting damages in common-law tort suits. Bivens (and, later, Carlson) ensured that tradition’s continued existence by recognizing a federal claim against federal officers who violate the Constitution. Such rights enforcement effectuates the judiciary’s longstanding role in maintaining the rule of law and the separation of powers.