WASHINGTON, DC – Following the Supreme Court’s decision this morning in Noem v. Al Otro Lado, a case in which the Court considered whether the government can ignore certain legal protections for people seeking asylum at ports of entry, Constitutional Accountability Center Senior Appellate Counsel Smita Ghosh issued the following reaction:

Today, the Supreme Court’s conservative supermajority endorsed a novel reading of the nation’s immigration laws that allows executive officials to turn back asylum-seekers at ports of entry without considering their claims for protection. This reading fundamentally misunderstands the relevant statutes. 

Immigration law requires immigration officers to offer the opportunity to apply for asylum to a noncitizen who is “present in the United States . . . or who arrives in the United States . . . at a designated port of arrival.” In today’s decision, the majority concluded that the phrase “arrives in the United States” cannot be understood to include people at ports of entry who have not physically crossed the border, even when they are blocked from crossing the border by government officials.

Purporting to rely on “everyday” language, Justice Alito wrote for the majority to explain that “a running back does not arrive in the end zone when he reaches the 1-yard line.” Needless to say, asylum-seekers do not make the life-or-death journey to U.S. ports of entry in order to score a touchdown. They seek to vindicate the right to seek protection from persecution—a right that is grounded in the country’s immigration statutes and international treaty commitments.

As Justice Sotomayor explained in dissent, the Court’s reasoning allows the executive branch to “circumvent the detailed and mandatory set of procedures” that Congress has enacted to ensure that the right to seek asylum is respected. And as our brief explained, U.S. immigration law has always been understood, even by the executive branch itself, to require immigration officers to receive asylum applications from people who reached ports of entry.

The Court’s majority also erred in relying on the presumption against extraterritoriality to “tip the scales” toward its reading of the statute. That presumption has no role to play in areas where the government exercises authority and control, as CAC explained in our amicus brief in this case. Echoing this conclusion, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that this case involves the conduct of U.S. immigration officers—clearly the subjects of the United States’ authority and control—and is “far afield” from the other cases in which the Supreme Court has invoked that presumption.